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Abstract—The smart features of modern cars are en-
abled by a number of Electronic Control Units (ECUs)
components that communicate through an in-vehicle
network, known as Controller Area Network (CAN)
bus. The fundamental challenge is the security of the
communication link where an attacker can inject mes-
sages (e.g., increase the speed) that may impact the
safety of the driver. Developing an effective defensive
security solution depends on the knowledge of the iden-
tity of the ECUs, which is proprietary information. This
paper proposes a message injection attack detection
mechanism that is independent of the IDs of the ECUs,
which is achieved by capturing the patterns in the mes-
sage sequences. First, we represent the sequencing of
the messages in a given time-interval as a direct graph
and compute the similarities of the successive graphs
using the cosine similarity and Pearson correlation.
Then, we apply threshold, change point detection, and
Long Short-Term Memory (LSTM)-Recurrent Neural
Network (RNN) to detect and predict malicious mes-
sage injections into the CAN bus. The evaluation of the
methods using a dataset collected from a moving vehi-
cle under malicious RPM and speed reading message
injections show a detection accuracy of 98.45% when
using LSTM-RNN and 97.32% when using a threshold
method. Further, the pace of detecting the change is
fast for the case of injection of RPM reading messages
but slow for the case of injection of speed readings
messages.
I. Introduction
The growing market explosion on modern cars with
high premium prices is driven by the increased consumer
awareness for their safety features and superior function-
alities. This is credited to a number of Electronic Control
Units (ECUs) components that communicate through an
in-vehicle network, known as Controller Area Network
(CAN) bus [1]. Within a single vehicle, there is a complex
network of around one hundred collaborating ECUs, as
depicted in Figure 1. These ECUs use a large software
base of about 100MB to control the functionalities of
the vehicle through message exchanges using the CAN
bus [2]. There are two types of CAN: (1) CAN-H (high),
a fast bus for communicating critical data, such as the
engine, transmission, and speed messages, and (2) CAN-L
(low), a slow bus for communicating non-critical data such
as infotainment data [2]. Most importantly, it’s used for
Fig. 1: Example of connected vehicle [3]
safety mechanisms such as; collision avoidance, anti-lock
brakes, traction control, and electron stability control.
Furthermore, the CAN bus enables intercommunication
link within the vehicle and external vehicles and devices
through WiFi, Bluetooth, or cellular networks. This capa-
bility is exploited by the Intelligent Transportation System
(ITS) applications, such as infotainment systems, fleet
management systems, parking assistance, remote diagnos-
tics, eCall, remote engine start, and Cooperative Adaptive
Cruise Control (CACC) systems. These applications com-
municate with the ECUs of the vehicle through the CAN
bus to improve the experience of the customers [3], [4],
[5] by, for example, reducing the speed and activating the
brakes of the vehicle.
The CAN bus was designed as a stable, safe, and flexible
closed network without considering security, specifically,
authentication and authorization mechanisms. In addition,
the extension of the network through the On-Board Diag-
nostics (OBD) to provide ways to report self-diagnosed
errors and malfunctions through On-Board Units (OBUs)
contributed to expanding the attack surface (the set of
ways an attacker can compromise the vehicle) through the
CAN bus [7], [8], [9]. Upstream’s research team identified
367 publicly reported incidents for a decade long [6]. The
analysis of these incidents shows an exponential growth of
attacks, as depicted by Figure 2a. Among these attacks,
27% involved taking control of the car, as depicted by
Figure 2b.
To remedy these security problems, a wide array of
defensive security solution schemes has been proposed.
Most of these solutions typically require the modification
of the CAN protocol, which is not practical for aftermarket






















(a) Increase of cyber-attacks on connected vehicles. (b) Impacts of cyber-attacks on connected vehicles.
Fig. 2: Growth and distribution of cyber-attacks on connected vehicles between 2010 and 2019 [6].
learning-based solutions driven by syntactic data through
simulations or data related to researchers’ devices to detect
malicious behaviors [10], which limits the practicality of
their efficacy. Many of the practical solutions require the
knowledge of CAN ID of the messages (the CAN messages
include an ID that indicates the information embedded in
the message, e.g., speed and brake) which is proprietary
to the car manufacturers [11].
In this paper, we answer the question: Can we detect
cyber-attacks on a moving vehicle without the need to
know the IDs of the vehicle’s ECUs? We hypothesize that
there is a pattern of messages sequences between the
collaborating ECUs of the vehicle, and injecting CAN
messages disrupts the sequences’ pattern. To answer this
question, we first develop a direct graph that represents
the sequence relations between ECUs messages based on
their CAN ID, which we call Messages-Sequence Graph
(MSG). Then, we use a sliding-window approach to com-
pare the similarity between the graphs computed from
the sequences of messages sent through the CAN bus in
successive time windows using the cosine similarity and
Pearson correlation metrics. Next, we apply the threshold,
change point detection, and LSTM-RNN techniques to
detect and predict injection attacks on the CAN bus. The
main contributions of the paper are:
1) A graph-based similarity metrics that capture the
variations in CAN messages patterns caused by mes-
sages injection attacks on the CAN Bus.
2) An effective LSTM-RNN-based Machine Learning
(ML) technique for detecting messages injections
attacks on CAN Bus from MSGs.
3) A change-point detection technique for detecting
messages injection attacks on CAN Bus from MSGs.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses
the security issues of the CAN protocol and Section III
reports about related work. Then, Section IV presents
the research method, Section V describes the evaluation
methods and Section VI reports the results. Section VII
concludes the paper.
II. Security Issues on CAN Protocol
The Controller Area Network (CAN) is a network proto-
col developed by Robert Bosch in 1986 [1] to communicate
the ECUs that control the behaviors of the vehicles’
mechanical and electrical components [12]. All cars man-
ufactured in USA after 2008 support the CAN protocol
and offer a means to interface with it through the On-
Board Diagnostics (OBD)-II port, which is usually located
under the steering wheel. The OBD is implemented in the
vehicles to provide ways to report self-diagnosed errors and
malfunctions [13] and is mandatory for all cars and light
trucks sold in the United States and the European Union.
This port gives direct access to the CAN network, which
inherently creates the attack surface, the set of ways an
attacker can penetrate the vehicle.
By design, CAN bus is resilient, robust, and easy to
wire but has a set of security weaknesses. The fundamental
security issues are: (1) The CAN bus data frame has no
source identifier field to identify the legitimacy of the send-
ing ECU. As a result, ECUs cannot trust messages based
on their sources. (2) The protocol does not protect the
confidentiality of CAN messages. Attackers can read the
messages exchanged in the CAN bus and infer information
that could be used to stage attacks, including associating
Priority IDs (PIDs) with ECUs. (3) The use of priority in
gaining the right to send messages could be easily used
to flood the bus of a vehicle with messages that have
small PIDs and prevent other ECUs from communicating
and makes their service unavailable, i.e., Denial of Service
(DOS) attack. frame [14].
Typically, attackers inject messages into the CAN bus,
suppress legitimate messages (i.e., legitimate messages
that have higher priority IDs than injected messages are
ignored) or compromise an ECU to behave maliciously
through either direct or indirect access points. Direct
access point attacks include the OBD-II port, the CD
player or the USB port [15]. For instance, the attacker
can inject malicious CAN messages through the USB port,
encode a malicious software onto a CD to exploit the
entertainment system of a car or use it to access the CAN
bus or update the firmware of an ECU. The indirect access
points are short and long-distance wireless access points
connected to the CAN bus. These include Bluetooth, on
broad Wi-Fi such as Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) devices,
remote keyless entry, Tire Pressure Monitoring System
(TPM), Global Positioning System (GPS) and cell phone
network.
The attack surface increases as more features, such as
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vehicle apps used for telematics services, road-side assis-
tance, V2V applications, and remote diagnostic, are added
in the car. Connecting vehicles to external entities through
wireless devices expose the security weaknesses of the CAN
bus [3]. Wolf et al. were among the pioneers in describing
the weaknesses of the CAN bus, including unauthorized
access into the CAN bus and lack of confidentiality and
integrity checks of CAN messages [16]. Further, Hartzell et
al. discussed the impacts of the common entry points, lim-
ited bandwidth, multi-cast messaging, lack of encryption
of messages, and multi-system integration on the security
of the CAN bus [15].
Valeseka and Miller demonstrated that hijacking con-
nected vehicles is possible. They identified remotely the IP
address of their Jeep car from the Sprint Cellular network
and took over the vehicle’s critical features, including dis-
abling breaks, controlling the steering wheels, and turning
on/off windshield wipers while the car is moving [17]. Re-
cently, Golston and Green reported successful exploits of
vulnerabilities to take control of recent Tesla cars [18], [19].
An experimental security analysis of the attack surface of
the connected vehicle including the short and long-range
wireless channels, the entertainment systems (i.e., CD
player, iPod port, USB port) and the electric charge port
was performed by Koscher et al. [20], who showed the wide
range of potential attacks on connected vehicles. Othmane
et al. [21] surveyed security experts and validated Koscher
et al.’s insights that attacks on connected vehicles are not
lab experiments anymore. Thus, an effective and practical
detection and prediction of injections of CAN messages is
critical for connected and autonomous vehicles.
III. Related work
Attackers take control of connected vehicles by inject-
ing messages into their in-vehicle networks, mainly their
CAN bus. Several hardware and software-based encryption
methods were proposed to prevent eavesdropping CAN
messages. For instance, Farag et al. proposed CANTrack,
which encrypts the data payload field of CAN messages
to prevent access to them by non-legitimate entities [22].
On the one hand, message authentication mechanisms are
considered to detect and/or prevent injection attacks. For
instance, Hiroshi et al. proposed the use of a secret key
that would be distributed to legitimate ECUs of the given
vehicle [23]. Each of the legitimate ECUs of the vehicle
must reject CAN messages that are not authenticated with
the key. Authentication-based mitigation solutions have
been heavily explored [24], [25], [26], [27], but they cannot
be used for aftermarket vehicles.
Other notable mitigation techniques have been reported
in e.g., [4], [3]. In general, some of these proposed miti-
gation solutions trade performance and security require-
ments given the computation and communication con-
straints of the ECU used in vehicles and time-criticality of
some of the messages (i.e., braking). Others, require mod-
ification of the currently well-vetted CAN bus protocol
(with respect to safety) which makes them not practical,
especially for aftermarket vehicles.
Early detection of message injection attacks on CAN
bus methods were based on frequency, entropy, and cor-
relation [28]. For instance, Taylor et al. proposed an
Intrusion Detection System (IDS) based on messages fre-
quency using the Hamming distance between successive
message data fields to detect attacks [29]. The methods
were validated using syntactic dataset, a data set that is
constructed by adding and removing messages to the set of
the CAN messages collected in normal driving conditions.
IDSs that are based on frequency, timing, and entropy are
effective for only attacks that disturb the frequencies of
CAN bus messages [10] because they assess the collision
management in the Carrier Sense Multiple Access with
Collision Detection (CSMA/CD) algorithm used by the
CAN bus.
Recently, there has been increased attention for the use
of machine learning techniques based on feature extraction
from the CAN bus data frame messages to identify attacks.
At the core of these solution methods is discriminating
messages associated to attacks and those that are not,
with acceptable accuracy and false positive [30]. Neural
Network (NN) has been the commonly used ML-based
approach for designing IDSs for the CAN bus, e.g., [31],
[32], [33], [11]. The main problem with this supervised
learning method is that it requires extensive time to de-
velop high-performance IDS models from labeled data [11]
and the trained models are specific for vehicle’ make and
model, and driver. The unsupervised ML-based IDSs use
mostly message-timing, message-frequencies, and message-
latency [34], [35]. These methods identify the CAN bus
fuzzing through the assessment of the contention algo-
rithm used in the CSMA/CD protocol.
Islam et al. investigated the use of patterns of sequences
of CAN messages types to detect attacks [36]. They
developed graph-based anomaly detection technique that
models the sequence of messages exchanged in the CAN
bus and used the chi-square metric to compare the median
between the successive graphs and showed its efficacy.
The method is known to have low power/efficiency (the
probability to avoid wrongly failing to reject the null
hypothesis) for moderate to large sample sizes.
The common data sources that are used to assess the
accuracy of the ML-based IDS solution include use of data
of own devices connected to a stationary vehicle, e.g., [37],
use of synthetic (artificial) data, e.g., [38], use of data
collected from simulators, e.g., [39], and use of data from
stationary vehicle, e.g., [34], [40], [36]. This limits the
confidence in the results and threatens its validity [41].
The evaluation of our IDS solutions uses datasets collected
from an in-motion vehicle under injection of fabricated
messages [42]. This exceptions to this is the work of
Stachowski [11] and Othmane et al. [10], who used datasets
collected from in-motion vehicles under messages injection
attacks. Both studies require knowing the association of
CAN ID to the vehicle’s ECUs, which is proprietary
information and dependent on the make or model.
Wu et al. [35] and Young et al. [43] provide compre-
hensive surveys on IDS for connected and autonomous
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Fig. 3: CAN Message Data Frame Format
Fig. 4: Similarity of two messages-sequence graphs at
successive time-window t (left) and t+1 (right). The labels
of the nodes are the PIDs and the labels of the edges are
number of times a message with the PID source of the
edge is followed by a message with the PID destination of
the same edge during the time-window. For example, 33
messages and 56 messages with ID 344 followed messages
with ID 342 at resp. time-windows t and t + 1, which
indicate a possible change of the behavior of the vehicle.
cars. Unlike most machine learning-based studies in the
literature, our proposed technique neither depends on the
make or model of the car nor its proprietary information
(i.e., CAN ID); it uses a combination of graph-based and
machine learning techniques.
IV. Research Method
We approached the problem of detecting and predicting
message injection attacks on modern cars by capturing
the patterns of the sequencing of the CAN messages
exchanged among the ECUs. As depicted by Figure 5,
data collected from the CAN bus are represented as a
direct Message-Precedence graph (left box). Then, the
Pearson and Cosine similarities of successive graphs are
used as the ML features (middle box). Finally, LSTM-
RNN, Threshold, and Point Change prediction is used
to predict messages injection (right box). We validate
our methodology using datasets collected from a moving
car while fabricated speed and RPM messages are being
injected into it’s CAN bus. We describe these methods in
the following subsections.
A. Message-sequence graph
Technically, CAN is a time-synchronized broadcast,
multi-cast reception message network bus. Figure 3 above
illustrates the CAN message format. Each message con-
sists of a data frame, remote frame, error frame, or
overload frame. The data frame is used to exchange data
Fig. 5: High-level View of Our Solution Methodology
between the nodes, the remote frame is used to request
the transmission of a specific identifier, the error frame
is transmitted by any node detecting an error, and the
overload frame is used to inject a delay between data or
remote frames [1].
Fig. 6: An Illustration of CAN data stream format– Each
row corresponds a Timestamp followed by the CAN bus
ID "can0", the process PID of the ECU (i.e., 264), followed
by "#" and the actual data in hexadecimal format.
Figure 6 shows a snapshot of a message captured from
the CAN bus. Each message has a freshness tag (like a
timestamp) followed by the CAN bus ID, the CAN ID of
the ECU, and the actual data. The ECU of a given vehicle
collaborate by exchanging successive messages through the
CAN bus to perform specific actions. For example, a CAN
message representing an increase of the fuel will usually
be followed by a message representing an increase of RPM
and most likely a message representing an increase of the
speed [10]. It is intuitive to see that each of these messages
have a sequence pattern; hence, the core of our solution
for detecting injection attacks.
With this, we hypothesize that there are patterns of
sequences of messages exchanged between the collaborating
ECUs of the vehicle and injecting CAN messages disrupts
the messages-sequence patterns. The idea is to capture the
pattern of the sequences of the messages and represent
it as a graph where the nodes represent the PIDs and the
edges represent the sequences of the messages of that given
PIDs. Note that the messages captured are independent of
vehicle’s ECUs.
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Algorithm 1 Message Graph Sequencer
Input: CANData: A batch of CAN messages with size
window
Input: window: Size of the batch messages
Output: MSG: message precedence graph
1: function ComputeMSG(data,window)
2: Call CreateDictionary()
3: for k ← 1 to N do
4: key ← concat(CANData[j][’PID’]
5: + CANData[j+1][’PID’])




Formally, let E(N1, N2) be an edge that represents a
CAN message with PID N1 followed by a CAN message
with PID N2. Let the label of edge E(N1, N2) represents
the frequency of CAN messages with PID N1 followed
by CAN messages with PID N2. We call this graph
Messages-Sequence Graph (MSG) as shown in Figure 4,
and the construction of the graph sequence is illustrated
in Algorithm 1.
In Algorithm 1, we first create a dictionary of the
PIDs exchanged in the CAN bus–The PIDs become the
labels of the rows and columns on a matrix representing
the edges of the MSG in line 2. Then, it loops over
all the CAN messages that were exchanged during the
time window w (we use windows of e.g., 100 successive
messages) and increases the label of the edge linking the
node representing the PID of a given message to the node
repressing the PID of the previously processed message
in lines 3-7. Equation 1 represents the distribution of the
messages-sequences at time t.
D(t) = E(Ni, Nj)(t) (1)
B. Feature extraction
We hypothesised that the MSG representing the mes-
sages exchanged in a CAN bus during a time slot t with
size w is similar to the MSG representing the CAN
messages exchanged during the following time slot t + 1
with same size w in the case of normal driving behavior
and that injection of messages into the CAN bus disrupts
this pattern. We formulate the Similarity concept for our
IDS using Equation 2. That is, the similarity Sim at time
t+1 is the similarity of the distributions of the messages-
sequences D at time t and at time t+1.
Sim(t + 1) = Similarity(D(t), D(t + 1)) (2)
There are several similarity metrics that measure the
similarity between two graphs [44] including Cosine simi-
larity, Pearson and Cramer correlation, chi-squared, T-test
and Levene’s tests. We briefly describe the two methods
that we selected for our study and the rationale behind
our choice.
Cosine similarity measures the cosine angle between two
non-zero vectors and determines whether the angle point
is in the same direction or not. It helps to tease apart the
types and relationships of vertices in social networks [44].
Simply, it’s metric measures the angle between two vectors
as formulated by Equation 3, where x and y are two
vectors. Cosine Similarity is often used to measure doc-
ument similarity, mainly for plagiarism detection. Simply,
the metric compares two documents by measuring the
similarity of the vectors of the frequencies of the words
in both documents, then outputs a number between 0 and













The cosine similarity for the two MSGs of Figure 4 is
0.66.
Pearson correlation. The correlation measures the
strength of the linear association between two non-zero
vectors and is given by Equation 4. It is widely used to
measure similarity [44]. It compares the similarity and
returns values between 1 and -1. The closer the value to 1
or -1, the strong the modeled relationship is.
PC(x, y) =
∑n





The Pearson correlation coefficients of the two MSGs of
Figure 4 is 0.63.
C. Prediction of messages injections
In conjunction with Cosine and Pearson similarity met-
rics, we employed three techniques to predict the messages
injection attacks, which are: threshold, LSTM-RNN and
Change Point Detection (CPD). In general, the threshold
is commonly considered as the base case, and the LSTM
and CPD are commonly used IDS solutions [45].
Threshold. A threshold is a selected value of the given
similarity metric that is believed to provide better accu-
racy in detecting injection of messages. To identify "good"
thresholds for the three selected similarity metrics, we
variate the threshold values for the given metric and
compute its accuracy until we observe an "optimal" value.
Recurrent Neural Network-Long Short-Term
Memory. The technique was first introduced in 1997
and become the core methodology deep learning [46]. It
is a gradient-based architecture developed for modeling
time-series data with long-term dependencies [47]. The
design solves the problem of vanishing gradient by
allowing errors to be back-propagated through time. The
LSTM was constructed using the sequential model of a
linear stack of layers, which are recurrently repeating
memory blocks. It is very powerful in sequence prediction
problems because it can store past information for a long
time.
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Fig. 7: An illustration of speed and RPM readings on the three datasets for a normal vehicle operation (left), and
the impact on message injection attacks for RPM reading on speed reading (center), and on speed reading on RPM
reading (right).
Change point detection. Change Point Detection
(CPD) is commonly used for detecting anomalous behav-
ior from time-series data [48]. The change point is defined
as the point at which the parameters that describe time-
series data e.g., mean and variance, abruptly change [49].
V. Evaluation methods
In this section, we discuss our experimental evaluation
setup and the parameters used for our study.
A. Evaluation datasets
In our previous study [10], we collected a log of CAN
bus messages for (1) normal driving behavior, (2) injection
of fabricated speed reading messages onto the CAN bus,
and (3) injection of fabricated RPM reading messages onto
the CAN bus of an in-motion Ford Transit 500 2017. The
data set is available in [42]. Table I shows the number
of CAN messages that were used in the research. Figure 7
shows the speed and RPM readings and their relationships
in the three datasets [10]. The plot at the left shows that
the speed of the vehicle varies between 0 and almost 30
mph and the RPM readings varies from almost 0 to almost
2300 units during a normal driving scenario. The plot at
the center shows that the speed of the vehicle in this
drive test reached almost 11 mph and the RPM readings
oscillates between the actual values and the value that
corresponds to the injected hex value "FFFF", i.e., 120000.
The plot at the right shows the RPM readings of the
vehicle in this drive test reached almost 1800 units and the
speed readings oscillates between the actual values and the
value that corresponds to the injected hex value "FFF", i.e.
almost 25 mph.
The Pearson correlation between the speed readings
and RPM readings represented by the orange lines in
Figure 7 shows a strong relationship (the coefficient is
0.85) between the 2 quantities in the plot at the left,
weak relationship (the coefficient is 0.33) in the plot at the
center, and no relationship (the coefficient is -0.013) in the
plot at the right [10]. This suggests that the ECUs of the
vehicle may act on the injected RPM readings but may not
act on the injected speed readings that they receive. The
TABLE I: Dataset Size
No Description # of CAN
messages
1 CAN Data for no injection of fabricated mes-
sages
23,963
2 CAN Data with injection of "FFF" as the
speed reading
88,492
3 CAN Data with injection of "FFFF" as the
RPM reading
30,308
difference between the correlation coefficients hints to the
impact of messages injection on the collaboration between
the ECUs of the car, which we explore in this paper.
B. Evaluation method for the similarity techniques
We first construct the MSGs from each time-window
(default 100) successive messages from the three CAN log
datasets described in Table I. Then, the similarity metrics
are used to compute the similarity values of the MSGs
series for each of the datasets.
To assess the efficacy of each of the similarity metric, we
plot the similarity values as time-series data to observe
the tendencies of the values computed from the three
datasets. Then, we plot the distributions of the frequencies
of the similarity values to observe whether similarity values
computed from the no injection of fabricated messages
dataset differ or not from the similarity values computed
from the RPM and speed injection of fabricated messages
datasets. Next, we use t-test [50] to statistically validate
the difference between the two distributions of similar-
ity values computed from the no injection of fabricated
messages dataset and the distributions of similarity values
computed from respectively RPM and speed injection of
fabricated messages datasets.
In addition, we set thresholds for each of the similarity
metrics and compared the similarity values computed from
the MSGs to these thresholds. A similarity value below
the threshold of the given similarity indicates injection of
messages at the related time-window. Subsequently, the
accuracy of the method in detecting injection of messages
onto the CAN bus is computed. The best thresholds that
we identified are 0.87 for both the cosine similarity and
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TABLE II: Normality Test for metric variables (Shapiro-
Wilk).




TABLE III: RNN-LSTM model parameters.
Parameters Value
Input layer 42 units
Second hidden layers 12 units
Dense/Output layer 1 units
Dropout rate 20%
Adam optimizer learning rate 0.01
Batch Size 128
Number of epochs 128
Ratio of the training dataset 2/3
Person correlation. Section VI-A discusses the results of
the evaluation.
C. Evaluation method for the change point detection tech-
nique
The CPD method estimates the point of change of a
population from a sample data. The method uses Markov-
Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) to sample the data and
Bayesian inference to detect the point at which the mean of
the population changes. The parameters of the model are
the mean and the standard deviation of the population and
the distributions of the data before the change point and
after the change point. We choose the Normal distribution
for both distributions. We tested the normality of cosine
similarity values and Pearson correlation coefficients com-
puted from the three datasets using the Shapiro-Wilk [51].
The p-values of the t-tests are provided by Table II. The
values indicate that all the datasets follow the Normal
distribution. We used PYMC [52], [53] to evaluate the
capability of the change point detection method to identify
injection of CAN messages.
Using CPD method to identify injection of messages
from the similarity data, we compared the identified point
of changes to the actual point of changes (i.e., the time
we started injecting messages) for each of the datasets.
In addition, we compare the strength of change for each
of the datasets, which is the proportion of the difference
between the mean before the change point and after the
change point to the average of the two means. We use
threshold 1% to interpret this strength of the change; a
strength of change above 1% implies there is a change and
a strength of change below 1% implies there is no change.
Section VI-B discusses the results of the evaluation.
D. Evaluation method for the RNN-LSTM
Initially, we developed prediction models using the Re-
current Neural Network (RNN)-Long Short-Term Memory
(LSTM) method from the three raw-datasets described
in Table I. The models had low performance. To have
datasets that have a balanced number of records wrt.
injection/no injection of CAN messages, we constructed
two datasets out the three row datasets as follows:
• We appended the injection of speed reading messages
onto the CAN bus dataset to the no injection of
fabricated messages dataset to form the constructed
speed readings injection dataset.
• We appended the injection of RPM reading messages
onto the CAN bus dataset to the no injection of
fabricated messages dataset to form the constructed
RPM readings injection dataset.
We used LSTM-RNN, as implemented in package
Keras [54], to predict injection of messages in the CAN
bus. Table III lists the parameters that were used in the
study. The sequences of MSG similarities are fed onto
the first/input layer of the LSTM model. The output of
the input layer is passed on to the second layer. The
output of the second hidden layer is then passed on to
the output/dense layer, which maps the output values to
binary values, representing the states injection of CAN
messages and no injection of CAN messages. The exper-
iment is performed for both dataset and the accuracy of
the method is computed and reported in Section VI-C.
VI. Results of the evaluation of the detection
on messages injection using similarity of
messages-sequences graphs
This section describes the capability of MSG similarity
metric in conjunction with threshold, RNN-LSTM, and
CPD to detect injection on CAN messages.
A. Evaluation of the threshold technique
This subsection describes the results of using cosine
similarity and Pearson correlation of MSGs and thresholds
to detect injection of CAN messages.
Cosine Similarity Method. Figure 8 and Figure 9 show
respectively the sequence of cosine similarity values and
the distribution of the cosine similarity values computed
from the three datasets. We observe from Figure 8 that the
plot of the sequence cosine similarity values extracted from
the no injection of fabricated messages dataset is higher
than the sequence of the cosine similarity values extracted
from the injection of fabricated reading messages dataset.
We observe from Figure 9 that the distribution of the
cosine similarity values extracted from the no injection
of fabricated messages dataset is different from the dis-
tribution of the cosine similarity values extracted from
the injection of fabricated reading messages dataset in
red color. The t-test confirms that injection of fabricated
messages onto the CAN bus impacts the sequence of
messages exchanged in the CAN bus. The t-test’s p-value
for the difference of the mean of the cosine similarity values
extracted from the injection of speed reading messages
dataset and the mean of the cosine similarity values
extracted from the no injection of fabricated messages
dataset is 1.12e−74 and the t-test’s p-value for the differ-
ence of the mean of the cosine similarity values extracted
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Fig. 8: Impact of the injection of speed reading messages (left) and RPM reading messages (right) on the of cosine
similarity values of the MSGs of successive time-windows; the cosine-similarity is higher without the injection of speed
and RPM reading messages.
Fig. 9: Impact of the injection of speed reading messages (left) and RPM reading messages (right) on the distribution
of the frequencies of the cosine similarity values of MSGs of successive time-windows.
from the injection of RPM reading messages dataset and
the mean of the cosine similarity values extracted from the
no injection of fabricated messages dataset is 2.61e− 69.
Pearson Correlation Method. Figure 10 shows the se-
quence of correlation coefficients extracted from the three
datasets over time, and Figure 11 shows the distribution of
correlation coefficients extracted from the three datasets.
We observe from Figure 10 that the plot of the sequence
Pearson correlation coefficients extracted from the no
injection of fabricated messages dataset is higher than
the sequence of the Pearson correlation coefficients ex-
tracted from the injection of fabricated reading messages
dataset. We observe from Figure 11 that the distribution
of the Pearson correlation coefficients extracted from the
no injection of fabricated messages dataset is different
from the distribution of the Pearson correlation coefficients
extracted from the injection of fabricated reading messages
dataset. The t-test confirms that injection of fabricated
messages onto the CAN bus impacts the sequence of
messages exchanged in the CAN bus.
The t-test’s p-value for the difference of the mean of
the Pearson correlation coefficients extracted from the
injection of speed reading messages dataset and the mean
of the cosine similarity values extracted from the no
injection of fabricated messages dataset is 9.466e−75 and
TABLE IV: Performance of the three similarity metrics






Cosine similarity 96.65 3.34 0.87
Pearson correlation 97.32 2.67 0.87
TABLE V: Performance of the similarity metrics when






Cosine similarity 89.20 10.80 0.87
Pearson correlation 90.57 9.43 0.87
the t-test’s p-value for the difference of the mean of the
cosine similarity values extracted from the the injection
TABLE VI: Performance of the similarity metrics when







Cosine similarity 89.4 10.6 0.87
Pearson correlation 86.8 13.20 0.87
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Fig. 10: Impact of the injection of speed reading messages (left) and RPM reading messages (right) on Pearson
correlation coefficients of MSGs of successive time-windows; the Pearson correlation coefficients are higher without
the injection of speed and RPM reading messages.
Fig. 11: Impact of injection of speed reading messages (left) and RPM reading messages (right) on the distribution of
the frequencies of the Pearson correlation coefficients of MSGs of successive time-windows.
of RPM reading messages dataset and the mean of the
cosine similarity values extracted from the no injection of
fabricated messages dataset is 1.6e− 70.
Accuracy of the Threshold Method. Table IV and
Table V summarize the accuracy of the threshold-based
method in detecting injection of messages using the two
similarity metrics applied to successive MSGs when using
the three datasets. Table VI shows also that the cosine
similarity and Pearson correlation have low false-positive
rates for the case of no injection of fabricated messages
dataset. We conclude that cosine similarity and Pearson
correlation exhibit excellent accuracy in detecting injec-
tion of speed and RPM reading messages.
B. Change point detection method
This subsection describes the capability of the CPD
method in conjunction with the cosine similarity and Pear-
son correlation of MSGs to detect injection of messages
onto the CAN bus.
Table VII and shows the identified point of changes and
the actual point of changes and Table VIII provides the
strength of changes computed from the three datasets for
both similarity techniques. Discussions on the capability
of the two similarity metrics follow.
TABLE VII: Comparing the identified point of changes to
the approximate actual point of change. (We set the point








Injection of RPM read-
ing messages
66 54 34
Injection of speed read-
ing messages
391 468 53
No injection of fabri-
cated messages
169 174 0
TABLE VIII: Ratio of the difference between the mean
before the change point and after the change to the average





Injection of RPM reading
messages
8.65 10.96
Injection of speed reading
messages
2.07 2.31




Fig. 12: Detection of point of change of successive MSGs from the Cosine Similarity when RPM reading messages
injected (left), speed reading messages injected (center), and normal operation (right).
Fig. 13: Detection of point of change of successive MSGs from the Pearson correlation coefficients when RPM injected
(left), speed message injection (center), and normal operation (right).
Cosine similarity. Figure 12 shows the identified change
points from the cosine similarity sequences computed from
the injection of RPM reading messages, injection of speed
reading messages and no injection of fabricated messages
datasets. The change points are at windows 66, 391, and
169 for resp. The injection of RPM readings, injection
of speed readings and no injection of fabricated messages
datasets. We observe that the method detects quickly the
change for the case of injection of RPM reading messages
dataset (after 32 time-windows) but with significant delay
for the case of injection of speed reading dataset dataset.
We also observe that the method wrongly detects a
change for the case of no injection of fabricated messages
dataset. We observe, however, that the strength of change
is 8.65% for the injection of RPM readings, 2.07% for the
case of injection of speed readings dataset, and 0.81% for
the case of no injection of fabricated messages dataset.
Therefore, the strength of the change metric indicates that
the method detects change for the case of injection of
RPM readings and injection of speed readings and does
not detect change for the case of no injection of fabricated
messages dataset.
Pearson correlation. Figure 13 shows the identified
change points from the Pearson correlation coefficients
sequences computed from the injection of RPM reading
messages, injection of speed reading messages, and no
injection of fabricated messages datasets. The change
points are at windows 54, 468, and 174 for resp. The
injection of RPM reading messages, injection of speed
reading messages and no injection of fabricated messages
datasets. We observe that the change was quickly detected
for the case of injection of RPM readings dataset (after 20
time-windows) but with a significant delay for the case of
injection of speed readings dataset.
We also observe that the method wrongly detects a
change for the no injection of fabricated messages dataset.
We observe, however, that the strength of change is 10.96%
for the injection of RPM reading messages dataset, 2.31%
for the case of injection of speed reading messages dataset,
and 0.75% for the case of the no injection of fabricated
message dataset. Therefore, the strength of the change
metric indicates that the method detects change for the
case of injection of RPM reading messages and injection
of speed reading messages and does not detect change for
the case of no injection of fabricated message dataset.
Summary. We observe that cosine similarity and Pearson
correlation detect injection of RPM messages quickly but
slow to detect injection of speed messages. In addition,
we observe that change strength allows detecting message
injection.
C. LSTM-RNN prediction method
We discuss in the following the performance of LSTM-
RNN in conjunction with the similarities of MSGs in
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TABLE IX: State-of-the-art IDS vs. our IDS solution.
IDS solution Description ML type Knowledge
of CAN ID
Accuracy
IDS Supplier 1 [11] Detection of cyclic messages injection provided by IDS Supplier 1 Sup. yes 1.0
IDS Supplier 2 [11] Detection of cyclic messages injection provided by IDS Supplier 2 Sup. yes 0.83
Previous work [10] Detection of injection of fabricated messages using HMM Unsup. yes 0.80
Threshold-MSGs Detection of injection of fabricated messages using MSG, Pearson
correlation similarity with threshold
Unsup. no 0.97
LSTM-MSGs Detection of injection of fabricated messages using MSG, Pearson
correlation similarity with LSTM-RNN
Sup. no 0.98
Note:
(*) LSTM stands for Long Short-Term Memory, Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), MSG stands for Messages-Sequence Graph, Sup. is for
supervised ML technique and Unsup. is for unsupervised ML.
TABLE X: Accuracy of LSTM-RNN in predicting injec-



















100 96.93 96.93 97.32 96.8
200 98.45 98.45 79.35 55
300 73.43 73.43 59.01 88.52
400 93.75 96.9 88.89 88.89
500 80.26 100 92.23 97.1
600 96.82 96.8 37.93 37.9
700 98.145 98.145 92 92
800 93.5 93.5 90.48 85.7
900 97.5 97.56 83.33 94.44
1000 97.73 97.3 100 100
predicting injection of messages onto the CAN bus.
Table X provides the accuracy of the LSTM-RNN
method in predicting injection of CAN messages from a
constructed injection of speed and RPM readings datasets
considering different window sizes. We observe that the
window size impacts the performance of LSTM-RNN in
detecting injection of CAN messages. The results show
that
1) the accuracy for the cosine similarity varies between
73.43% and 98.45% for the case of constructed injec-
tion of speed reading messages dataset and between
37.93% and 100% for the case of constructed injec-
tion of RPM reading messages dataset;
2) the accuracy for the Pearson correlation varies be-
tween 73.43% and 100% for the case of constructed
injection of speed reading messages dataset and
between 37.9% and 100% for the case of constructed
injection of speed reading messages dataset.
We conclude that LSTM-RNN exhibits excellent accu-
racy in predicting injection of CAN messages onto the
CAN bus from the constructed injection of speed and
RPM readings messages dataset when using cosine sim-
ilarity and Pearson correlation to compute the similarities
of the consecutive MSGs.
D. Impact of the results
Although there are several machine learning-based mes-
sage injection attack detection studies in the literature,
we found, to the best of our knowledge, Stachowski et
al. [11] is the closest study related to our work since they
use datasets from in-motion vehicles. Table IX compares
the IDS solutions that we developed with the two pre-
commercials IDSs (Supplier 1 and Supplier 2) that were
evaluated by Stachowski et al. [11] and the IDS that we
proposed earlier [10]. One of the NN-based IDS that was
evaluated by Stachowski et al. on three vehicles makes
(each was tested for several hours) showed complete ac-
curacy (1.0) but requires knowledge of the association of
CAN IDs to the corresponding ECUs for each of the vehi-
cle make and requires the use of a pre-trained prediction
model–uses a supervised ML technique.
Our proposed IDS solution does not require the knowl-
edge of the association of CAN IDs to the corresponding
ECUs of the vehicle and shows good accuracy, up to 0.98,
when a supervised ML (RNN-LSTM) is used, and with
high accuracy when an unsupervised method (threshold
technique) is used, up to 0.97. This shows that our scheme
is a practical generic IDS solution as it does not use
proprietary information from the car manufacturers. Addi-
tionally, the CPD-MSGs method showed a quick detection
of injection of fabricated messages as discussed in the
previous section. Note that we used in this study three
datasets related to one driver and one vehicle. We consider
experimental evaluation for a set of vehicles and drivers in
our future work.
VII. Conclusions
The number of cyber-attacks on connected vehicles is in-
creasing. The research community has proposed anomaly-
based Intrusion Detection System (IDS) solutions to ad-
dress this problem. The main advantage of this solutions is
that it does not require modification to the CAN protocol.
Existing IDSs either use the entropy of messages or require
the knowledge of the IDs of the different sensors/actua-
tors of the test vehicle. This paper investigates the use
of Messages-Sequence Graph (MSG), which models the
sequences of CAN messages in a time window to detect
message injection. The study found that the cosine simi-
larity and Pearson correlation of the sequence of MSGs are
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